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MARMALADE SQUARE ; 
CONDOMINIUM HOMEOWNERS ; 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation,; 
BRUCE MANKA and FRANK ; 
GUYMAN ; 
Defendants/Appellants. ] 
) Court of Appeals No. 20090166 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 78A-4-103(2)0) (2009) and Utah R. App. 
P. 5. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue presented for consideration by this appeal is whether the trial 
court committed reversible error in granting the Plaintiffs motion to set aside its 
default after the Appellee and its lawyer failed to appear for the scheduled trial in 
the matter. 
1 
Although "a trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to set aside a 
default judgment," that "discretion is not unlimited." Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277 
(Utah 2000). The Utah Supreme Court will overturn a trial court's decision to set 
aside a default if it has abused its discretion. See id. 
As a threshold matter, a trial court's ruling must be 'based on adequate 
findings of fact1 and 'on the law.'" Id. (quoting May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 
1110 (Utah 1984) (per curiam)). While the trial court should exercise its discretion 
"in furtherance of justice and should incline towards granting relief in a doubtful 
case to the end that the party may have a hearing," Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636 
P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 1981), "[a] decision premised on flawed legal conclusions . . 
. constitutes an abuse of discretion." Lund, supra at 277. In the context of a denial 
of a rule 60(b) motion, the Court reviews " . . . a district court's findings of fact 
under a clear eirror standard of review." Menzies v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 480 (Utah 
2006) (citing Chen v. Stewart, 123 P.3d 416 (Utah 2005)). The trial court's 
conclusions of law, however, are reviewed under a "correctness" standard which 
affords the trial court no deference," id. (citing Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons 
Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). 
Rule 60(b) allows a court "upon such terms as are just" and "in the 
furtherance of justice" to relieve a party from a judgment for "mistake, 
2 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . or . . . any other reason justifying 
relief/' Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Presumably, Plaintiffs theory before the trial court 
was essentially one of excusable neglect. To demonstrate that the default was due to 
excusable neglect, f[t]he movant must show that he has used due diligence and that 
he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control.f" 
Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State Ins. Dep't., 991 P.2d 607 (UT. App 1999) (quoting 
Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973)) 
(alteration in original). "In the absence of such a showing, [a defaulting party]fs 
assertion does not demonstrate his neglect was excusable.ff Id. 
The Defendants preserved the issue as demonstrated by their Memorandum 
in Opposition to the Motion to Set Aside (R. 384-389). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES 
There are no determinative constitutional or statutory provisions upon which 
Appellants rely. Rather, the issue raised in this matter is governed by Utah R. Civ. 
P. 60(b) and interpreting case law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The Plaintiff/Appellee filed this action seeking to obtain a judgment against 
the Defendants for drain and line cleaning services it rendered (R. 1-11). 
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Defendants have maintained throughout the proceedings that they are not 
responsible for charges related to the Plaintiff/Appellee's services. See 
Defendant/Appellants5 Motion to Dismiss (R. 42-52); Defendant/Appellants' 
Second Motion to Dismiss (R. 68-81); Defendant/Appellants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment (R. 133-155, 164-171); and, Defendant/Appellants' Motion to Dismiss 
Second Amended Complaint (R. 218-237). 
B. Course of Proceedings Below. 
The Complaint in this case was filed on January 19, 2005 (R. 1). The Record 
is replete with motions to dismiss and for summary judgment filed by the 
Defendants/Appellants. Id. The Plaintiff, in an effort to combat the grounds for 
dismissal and summary judgment urged by the Defendants/Appellants, has 
amended its Complaint twice R. 107-08, 188-194). The Court has awarded attorney 
fees to the Defendants/Appellants based upon the Plaintiffs conduct (R. 195-96). 
Ultimately, on July 8, 2008, the case was set for pretrial on July 22, 2008 (R. 
325-26). At the time of the Pretrial Conference, the case was set for a bench trial on 
October 14, 2008 at 9:30 a.m. (R. 328). However, the Notice of Bench Trial that 
was sent to counsel by the trial court, on July 22, 2008, set the trial date for 
November 14, 2008 at 9:30 a.m. (R. 333-335). The Court docket will reflect that on 
July 25, 2008, the Court sent a Corrected Notice of Bench Trial to counsel changing 
4 
the trial date back to October 14, 2008 at 9:30 a.m., the date established at the time 
of the Pretrial Conference (R. 337-39). 
On July 29, 2008, as a result of a conference call with the Court and both 
counsel, the trial date was changed to October 28, 2008, at 9:30 a.m., a date and 
time accepted by both counsel (340-41). 
Both parties filed witness and exhibit designations as ordered by the trial 
court in preparation for trial (R. 350-55, 356-65). On the morning of trial, October 
28, 2008, the Defendants/Appellants with counsel appeared. The Plaintiff and its 
counsel did not. The trial court then authorized the entry of the Plaintiffs default. 
However, the clerk mistakenly indicated in the minutes of the bench trial that it was 
the Defendants that did not appear (R. 366). 
The Defendants/Appellants filed a motion with supporting memorandum and 
affidavit to correct the entry of default on October 30, 2008 (R. 367-71, 374-83). 
The Plaintiff/Appellee filed a two-page motion to set aside the default and set a new 
trial date on November 3, 2008 (R. 372-373). The Defendants/Appellants filed a 
memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiff/Appellee's motion to set aside the 
default (R. 384-89). The Plaintiff did not file a memorandum in support of its 
motion to set aside the default or in opposition to the Defendants motion to correct 
the default. 
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C. Disposition of the Trial Court 
Although the trial court signed an Order correcting the minutes of the bench 
trial and entering the default of the Plaintiff/Appellee (R. 398-99), the trial court 
negated the effect of that Order and set aside the Plaintiffs default by Minute Entry 
dated February 4, 2009. The Minute Entry did not contain any findings of fact or 
underlying reasoning explaining the basis of the trial court's action (400-401). It is 
from that Order and Minute Entry that the Defendants/Appellants sought 
interlocutory appeal (R. 405-06). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Plaintiff initiated this action on January 19, 2005, more than four 
years ago, to obtain judgment against the Defendants for drain and line cleaning 
services that it provided in and around the Marmalade Square Condominium 
Development, located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah (R. 1-11). 
2. The Defendants have vehemently denied responsibility for the charges 
associated with the services because a) the charges for the services of the Plaintiff 
were the responsibility of individual condominium owners not named in the action; 
b) the corporate entities sued by the Plaintiff in this case did not exist when the 
services were allegedly performed and are not responsible therefore; c) the person 
ordering and signing for the Plaintiffs services was not an agent or employee of 
6 
any of the Defendants; and d) most of the Plaintiffs invoices fail to identify the 
Marmalade condominiums as the area of service. See Defendant/Appellants' 
Motion to Dismiss (R. 42-52); Defendant/Appellants' Second Motion to Dismiss 
(R. 68-81); Defendant/Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 133-155, 
164-171); and, Defendant/Appellants' Motion to Dismiss Second Amended 
Complaint (R. 218-237). 
3. On July 8, 2008, the trial court set the matter for pretrial conference on 
July 22, 2008 (R. 325-26). At the time of the Pretrial Conference, counsel for both 
parties appeared and the case was set for a bench trial on October 14, 2008 at 9:30 
a.m. (R. 328). However, the Notice of Bench Trial that was sent to counsel by the 
trial court on July 22, 2008, erroneously set the trial date for November 14, 2008 at 
9:30 a m (R. 333-335). 
4. The Court docket reflects that on July 25, 2008, the Court sent a 
Corrected Notice of Bench Trial to counsel changing the trial date back to October 
14, 2008 at 9:30 a.m., the date established at the time of the Pretrial Conference (R. 
337-39). 
5. On July 29, 2008, as a result of a conference call with the Court and 
both counsel, the trial date was changed to October 28, 2008, at 9:30 a.m., a date 
and time accepted by both counsel. A Notice of Rescheduled Bench Trial was then 
7 
sent to counsel on that same day, July 29, 2008 (R. 340-41, Addendum, Exhibit 
"A"). The Notice setting the matter for trial on October 28, 2008, was sent to the 
correct addresses for counsel and explicitly provided therein that nonappearance at 
trial could result in the entry of default of the non-appearing party. Id. 
6. Both parties filed witness and exhibit designations as ordered by the 
trial court in preparation for trial (R. 350-55, 356-65). 
7. On the morning of trial, October 28, 2008, at 9:30 a.m., the 
Defendants/Appellants, with counsel, appeared early, ready for trial. The judge set 
to try this case, Judge Robert P. Faust, was hearing another matter when the 
Defendants and their counsel arrived. Judge Faust waited fifteen minutes after the 
time set for trial, 9:30 a.m., and still, the Plaintiff and its counsel did not appear. 
8. The trial court then authorized the entry of the Plaintiffs default based 
upon the nonappearance at trial and further authorized attorney fees attendant to the 
defense of the Plaintiffs action. However, when the clerk created the minutes of 
the scheduled bench trial, she mistakenly indicated that it was the Defendants 
instead of the Plaintiffs that did not appear at trial (R. 366, Addendum, Exhibit 
"B"). 
9. The Defendants/Appellants immediately filed a motion with 
supporting memorandum and affidavit to correct the erroneous entry of Defendants' 
8 
default and authorize the entry of the Plaintiffs default. The motion with 
supporting memorandum and affidavit was filed on October 30, 2008 (R. 367-71, 
374-83, Addendum, Exhibit "C"). 
10. The Plaintiff/Appellee, on November 3, 2008, filed a two-page motion 
to set aside the Plaintiffs default and set a new trial date (R. 372-373, Addendum, 
Exhibit "D" ). In the Motion, counsel for the Plaintiff asserted that he believed the 
trial date was November 14, 2008 instead of October 28, 2008. Id. However, 
counsel for the Plaintiff, in his motion, did not deny that he was privy to the 
conference call with the court and other counsel on July 29, 2008, setting the 
October 28, 2008 trial date. Further Plaintiffs counsel did not deny receiving thei 
Notice of Rescheduled Bench Trial, setting the October 28, 2008 trial date <R. 340). 
Finally, the motion of the Plaintiff was unaccompanied by a memorandum, affidavit 
or other verified pleading. Id. 
11. In the Affidavit submitted by counsel for Defendants/Appellants, 
counsel for the Defendants very carefully, under oath, recited the events that had 
resulted in the setting of the October 28 trial date, the events that transpired on the 
day of trial including the time that the trial court and counsel waited for the Plaintiff 
and the eventual order of the trial court for entry of default and authorizing of 
attorney fees (R. 374-81, Addendum Exhibit "C"). 
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12. The Defendants/Appellants filed a memorandum in opposition to the 
Plaintiffs motion to set aside the default authorized by the trial court (R. 364-89, 
Addendum Exhibit "E"). In the memorandum the Defendants/Appellants explicitly 
outlined all the deficiencies of the Plaintiffs motion. Id. 
13. Plaintiff did not file, in response to the Defendants5 memorandum, any 
additional pleading supplementing its motion, such as a memorandum addressing 
the legal basis and adequacy of the Plaintiffs motion, an affidavit attesting to the 
factual basis of the motion, or any other evidence to support the motion. 
14. On December 22, 2008, Judge Faust signed the Order Correcting Entry 
of Default, prepared by counsel for the Defendants (R. 398-399, Addendum Exhibit 
"F"). In relevant part, the Order stated: 
1. The Court hereby relieves the Defendant from the default 
entered on October 28, 2008 against the Defendants. 
2. The Court hereby enters the default of the Plaintiff, who failed 
to appear for trial on October 28, 2008. 
Id. 
15. Then on February 4, 2009, Judge Faust signed a Minute Entry that 
provided: 
This case came before the court for consideration of Defendant's 
Motion for Correction of Entry of Default and Plaintiffs Motion to Set 
Aside Default and Set New Trial Date. After review of the file and 
pleadings therein, the court rules that the default of any party 
previously entered is hereby set aside. The clerk is directed to set this 
case for a Pretrial Conference, so that settlement discussions may be 
10 
affected and/or a mutually acceptable date for a Bench Trial may be 
set. This minute entry is the order of the court on this issue; no further 
order is required. 
R. 400, Addendum, Exhibit "G". 
16* Defendants/Appellants then filed their Petition seeking permission to 
Appeal from Judge Faust's February 4, 2009 Minute Entry (R. 405-06). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Defendants/Appellants contend that the signed Minute Entry of February 
4, 2009 (R. 400, Addendum, Exhibit "G") setting aside the default of the Plaintiff in 
this case constituted an abuse of discretion. Appellants submit that they are entitled 
to have the ruling encompassed in the Minute Entry setting aside the Plaintiffs 
default, reversed and the matter remanded to the district court for the assessment of 
attorney fees and costs. 
The action taken by Judge Faust in signing the Minute Entry of February 4, 
2009, constituted an abuse of discretion because first, the submission by the 
Plaintiff was deficient because it did not comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 7. The 
motion was filed without a memorandum and did not state a legal basis for the relief 
requested. 
Second, in contravention of Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) and the standard 
established by the Utah Supreme Court in Erickson v. Schenkers, 882 P.2d 1147 
11 
(Utah 1994), the Plaintiff/Appellee did not establish a basis for relief under the Rule 
(mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect).1 The Plaintiff failed to submit any 
evidence by way of verified pleading or affidavit that would even commence a Rule 
60(b) examination. Further, the explanation given by Plaintiff for nonappearance 
does not meet the well-defined definition of mistake, inadvertence or excusable 
neglect. Specifically, the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate due diligence in 
establishing a Paile 60(b) basis. 
Third, an examination of case law establishes that the facts set out in the 
Plaintiffs motion are deficient as a matter of law under the Rule 60(b) standard. 
Fourth, the ruling of the trial court setting aside the default was deficient 
because it did not include the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law that 
demonstrated conformity with the legal standard for evaluating a Rule 60(b) 
motion. Additionally, Rule 60(a) did not provide a basis for setting aside the default 
of the Plaintiff. 
Lastly, the Defendants/Appellants are entitled to have this case remanded for 
the assessment of attorney fees and costs reasonably in the defense of this matter 
and on appeal. 
1
 The Plaintiff, in its Motion to Set Aside the Default (R. 372-73), never cited a legal 
basis for its motion. Appellants have assumed throughout the proceeding that the 
Plaintiff was filing under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Appellants filed their memorandum 
in opposition to Plaintiffs motion based upon Rule 60(b) and the Plaintiff failed to 
file any further pleading identifying a different legal basis. 
12 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR RULE 60(b) 
RELIEF IS DEFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW 
The motion of the Plaintiff, seeking relief from the default was deficient as a 
matter of law because it failed to conform with any of the legal requirements 
attendant to the request. 
A. The Plaintiffs Application for Relief Violated Utah R. Civ. 
P. 7. 
In relevant part, Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) states: 
An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, 
unless made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court 
commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion 
shall be in writing and state succinctly and with particularity the 
relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought. (Emphasis 
added) 
Id. 
The Plaintiffs motion is completely devoid of any explanation of the legal 
basis or grounds upon which the Plaintiff relied. Further, Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1) 
clearly requires a motion seeking to set aside a default to be accompanied by a 
supporting memorandum. Plaintiff failed to supply a supporting memorandum of 
any kind explaining the legal basis for the relief requested. 
In Holton v. Holton, 243 P.2d 438 (Utah 1952), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that although the rules of civil procedure ". . . were intended to provide liberality in 
13 
procedure, it is nevertheless expected that they will be followed, and unless reasons 
satisfactory to the court are advanced as a basis for relief from complying with 
them, parties will not be excused from so doing. . . It is only when a showing is 
made that some inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or mistake has occurred 
and that substantial injustice will be done, that a party will be relieved from failure 
to comply with the rules." Id. 
The Rules of Procedure are to be interpreted in a manner to do substantial 
justice. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(f). However, the serving up of a request for relief that 
fails to inform other counsel and the court of the factual and legal basis therefore 
should not be tolerated. In this case, there was no supporting memorandum or 
affidavit that would fill in the blanks left by the motion. The pleading left all the 
work for the Defendants to try and figure out the basis of the motion and then 
respond thereto. Even after the inadequacy of the motion was pointed out, the 
Plaintiff failed to supplement the motion to provide the required factual and legal 
basis. Defendants submit that the complete failure to comply with Rule 7 should 
meet with a sanction. If the party requesting the relief does not put the work into 
the project to supply a legal basis, there should be no requirement for the other 
party and the court to respond thereto. 
B. The Plaintiffs Motion Failed to Provide the Court with a 
Legal or Factual Basis for Relief. 
14 
The explanation provided in the Plaintiffs motion for the nonappearance at 
trial was, "[t]he Plaintiff believed the trial was set for November 14, 2008" (R. 
372). The statement contained in the motion was not supported by an affidavit or 
verified pleading. The pleading did not cite a theory, rule or legal basis upon which 
the request was based. Utah R. Civ. P. 43(b) states: 
(b) Evidence on motions. When a motion is based on facts not 
appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits 
presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that 
the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or 
depositions. (Emphasis added) 
Id. 
One can analogize to the disposition of a motion for summary judgment. 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in Rule 
56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or by 
submission of deposition testimony or other verified pleading, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Cowen and Co. v. Atlas 
Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984); see also Brigham Truck & 
Implement Co. v. Fridal 746 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Utah 1987) ("[B]are contentions, 
unsupported by any specifications of facts in support thereof, raise no material 
15 
questions of fact."); Overstock.com, Inc. v. Smart Bar gains, Inc., 192 P.3d 858 (Utah 
2008). 
The bare allegation that the Plaintiff thought the trial was on another day is 
simply insufficient as a matter of law to even create a Rule 60(b) issue. Certainly, 
after the Defendants/Appellants supplied a memorandum in opposition to the 
Plaintiffs motion and an Affidavit carefully setting out how the trial date was 
arrived at and noticed by the Court, the bare allegation of the Plaintiff did not create 
a justiciable issue of fact (R. 374-81). 
Of course, there are a number of major facts that the bare allegation in the 
Plaintiffs motion does not address. First, was it the Plaintiff or his counsel that 
thought the trial was on another date? Second, does counsel for the Plaintiff dispute 
that he received the Notice from the trial court setting the trial date? Third, does 
counsel for the Plaintiff deny there was a telephone conference with other counsel 
and the court wherein the date for the trial was arrived at? Fourth, what facts are 
there that the Plaintiff acted with due diligence in recording the trial date, checking 
the calendar, informing the client, etc. Defendant would submit that if counsel for 
the Plaintiff was acting with due diligence, he would have sent the notice of trial to 
his client and calendared the date in his calendaring system. It is hard to understand 
how both the lawyer's office and the client could have missed the date if that simple 
16 
process of mailing the notice of trial was followed. However, because there was no 
evidence of due diligence submitted, there is no way to evaluate that critical issue. 
Defendants/Appellants submit that the motion of the Plaintiff/Appellee was 
insufficient as a matter of law to constitute a claim for relief under Rule 60(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the trial court did not have a legal or 
factual basis upon which he could exercise his discretion and relieve the Plaintiff 
from the default. 
POINT II: THE ALLEGATION CONTAINED IN THE 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION WAS INSUFFICIENT UNDER 
RULE 60(b) 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in relevant part as 
follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. . . . The 
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), 
or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
was entered or taken. . . The procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action. (Emphasis added) 
Id. 
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As established by the Utah Supreme Court in Erickson v. Schenkers, 882 
P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994), in order to prevail on a motion to set aside a default 
judgment, the moving party must establish 1) that the motion seeking relief was 
timely filed (within three months); 2) that a basis for the relief has been established 
under the Rule (mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect); and 3) that the party 
against whom the default has been entered has a meritorious defense on the merits. 
Id. See also, Hernandez v. Baker, 104 P.3d 664 (Utah App. 2004); Black's Title, 
Inc., 991 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1999); and Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000). 
If the Court finds that the Plaintiff/Appellee's motion was legally sufficient, 
there is no question that it was filed within three months of the entry of default. 
Additionally, since the Defendants/Appellants' multiple motions to dismiss and for 
summary judgment had been denied by the trial court, it must be assumed that the 
third element of having a prima facie case had been met for purposes of a Rule 
60(b) motion. 
Therefore, in determining the legal sufficiency of the Plaintiff/Appellee's 
motion, the Court must decide whether the stated ground contained in the Plaintiffs 
motion constitutes a basis for relief under the rule. In the two-page motion, the 
Plaintiff states: 
The Plaintiff believed that the trial date was November 14, 2008, and 
has prepared for that date. It appears that the trial date was originally 
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set for November 14, 2008, and then changed to October 14, 2008 and 
then changed again to October 28, 2008. The Plaintiff believed the trial 
was set for November 14, 2008. . . . 
R. 372-73, Addendum Exhibit "D" 
As recited above, there are no affidavits or other verified pleadings that 
establish the circumstances surrounding the missing of the trial date. We do not 
know if Plaintiffs counsel recorded the trial date when it was set during the 
conference call with the court. We do not know if counsel recorded the trial date 
when the written notice from the court was received. We do not know if counsel 
sent a copy of the trial notice to his client. We do not know when counsel and his 
client met for trial preparation and how both the client and the lawyer could have 
been confused if they both had the written notice of the court. 
It is the Defendant's contention that given the facts in this case, the Plaintiff 
cannot make out a case for mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect in missing 
the trial because the Defendant failed to submit evidence of the circumstances 
attendant thereto. The facts are that the change of the trial date was done with the 
trial court and counsel in a telephone conference. An appropriate notice was sent to 
counsel thereafter and if the notice was recorded in the due course of business and 
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sent to the client, it would be utterly impossible for both the lawyer and client to 
miss the trial date. 
A. The Plaintiff has not Established Mistake, Inadvertence, 
Surprise, or Excusable Neglect. 
The case law is clear. It is not sufficient for a party or the lawyer, acting for 
the party, to simply claim that he did not appear at a trial because he had 
erroneously concluded that the trial was to be held on another day. The Utah Court 
of Appeals has held that "[t]o demonstrate that the default was due to excusable 
neglect, '[t]he movant must show that he has used due diligence and that he was 
prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control.1'1 Black's 
Title, Inc., supra, 991 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1999) (quoting Airkem Intermountain, 
Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973)) (alteration in original). In 
fact, the Utah Supreme Court has defined "excusable neglect" as "the exercise of 
fdue diligence1 by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." Mini 
Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987) (citing Airkem 
Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973)). 
In fact, in Interstate Excavating v. Agla Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 
1980), the Utah Supreme Court gave a thorough explanation of excusable neglect 
and due diligence: 
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This Court has previously stated that neglect, to be excusable, must 
occur despite the exercise of due diligence. Airkem Inter mountain, Inc. 
v. Parker, supra, footnote 5. Other jurisdictions have defined 
excusable neglect as "such as might have been the act of a reasonably 
prudent person under the same circumstances." Kromm v. Kromm, 191 
P.2d 115 (Cal App. 1948). It has also been held that simple 
carelessness does not rise to the statutory standard, Doyle v. Rice 
Ranch Oil Co., 81 P.2d 980 (Cal App. 1938), nor do simple business 
difficulties which allegedly prevent the dedication of adequate 
attention to the litigation in question. Usery v. Weiner Bros., Inc., 70 
F.R.D. 615 (D.C. 1976). Moreover, this Court has held that the failure 
of a party to appear in court, allegedly occasioned by failure of notice 
due to withdrawal of counsel, does not constitute such "excusable 
neglect" as to justify relief from judgment. . . . [citing case]. 
Id. 
Because there is no evidence of due diligence, the simple fact that a party 
thought that trial was on another day, does not make out a Rule 60(b) case. A Party 
must show all that he or she did that could constitute due diligence and then claim 
that in spite of reasonable care and due diligence, the trial date was missed. In this 
case, the Plaintiff utterly failed to provide any proof of reasonable care or due 
diligence. 
B. The Allegation in Plaintiffs Motion is Insufficient Under the 
Facts Presented in Other Cases Decided by the Utah 
Appellate Courts. 
In Allred v. Allred, 2005 UT App 338 (2005), the district court entered 
judgment against the defendant after he failed to appear at the scheduled trial and 
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denied his motion for a new trial and for relief from judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 
59 and 60. Id. The Utah Appellate Court found that the district court mailed 
defendant a "notice of trial" which was signed by the district court judge. The notice 
timely and adequately described the nature of the proceedings against him. The 
Court of Appeals found that the district court's finding that defendant did not act 
with ordinary prudence or as a result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect was well supported. Id. 
In Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 Utah 2d 293, 373 P.2d 573 (1962), "the 
[defendant's] attorney thought he had filed an answer b u t . . . he had mistakenly not 
done so." Id. at 573. The Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in granting a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff when the 
evidence was that "the attorney then representing the plaintiff called the defendant's 
attorney's attention to the fact that the matter was in default and that a default 
judgment would be taken unless something was done." Id.; see also Pacer Sport & 
Cycle, Inc. v. Myers, 534 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1975) (finding no excusable neglect 
under rule 60 where defendant "assumed the action had been taken care of and 
therefore took no steps to file an answer to the complaint"). 
As noted above, the Utah Supreme Court has defined "excusable neglect" as 
"the exercise of 'due diligence' by a reasonably prudent person under similar 
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circumstances." Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 
1987) (citing Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 
431 (1973)). The Record in this case is entirely empty as to the Plaintiffs exercise 
of reasonable care and due diligence. There were simply no facts that could have 
been construed in favor of the Plaintiffs position that demonstrated that the 
Plaintiff and his lawyer took reasonable and ordinary steps to calendar the trial 
setting, circulate the notice thereof to the client and witnesses, met to prepare for 
trial, and then, in spite of efforts demonstrating reasonable care and due diligence, 
somehow missed the trial date. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN 
FAILING TO ENTER FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
As noted in Hunt v. Hunt, 2004 UT App 2 (Ut Ct. App. 2004), "a trial court 
has broad discretion in deciding whether to set aside a default judgment." Lund v. 
Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000) (per curiam). However, a trial court's discretion is 
not limitless and "must be based on adequate findings of factf and on the law.'" Id. 
(quoting May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984) (per curiam)). 
Likewise, in Davis v. Goldsworthy , 184 P.3d 626 (Ut. Ct. App. 2008), the Court 
stated that while a trial court has considerable discretion with regard to Rule 60, 
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"[a] decision premised on flawed legal conclusions . . . constitutes an abuse of 
discretion." Lund, supra. 
Of course, in this case, there is nothing in Judge Faust's signed Minute Entry 
of February 4, 2009, that reveals his thought process in deciding to set aside the 
default of the Plaintiff that was entered on December 22, 2008, barely two months 
before (R. 398-399. 400). Accordingly, the decision does not conform with the 
requirements established by this Court requiring sufficient findings and conclusions 
so that the decision process is clear on review. Based thereon, the ruling constituted 
an abuse of discretion warranting reversal. 
However, the Defendants/Appellants contend that the Plaintiffs motion for 
relief is defective as a matter of law and therefore could not be used by the trial 
court to grant relief under Rule 60(b). The Plaintiff simply failed to provide the 
trial court with evidence of reasonable care and due process. Therefore the simple 
conclusion that the party was mistaken as to the trial date is insufficient as a matter 
of law. 
Accordingly, Defendants request that this Court so rule that although the 
decision of the trial court was defective based upon the absence of findings, there 
was no record upon which an order relieving the Plaintiff from default could have 
been fashioned. There is one additional issue that should be addressed and that is 
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the inherent right of the trial court to correct clerical mistakes pursuant to Utah R. 
Civ. P. 60(a). The Rule provides: 
Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts 
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the 
motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. 
During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected 
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter 
while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the 
appellate court. 
Id. 
In Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984), the question addressed on appeal 
was whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion to correct its 
earlier order "nunc pro tunc." The order dismissed a defendant, from the lawsuit 
"with prejudice," and defendant sought a change to reflect a dismissal "without 
prejudice." The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order refusing to correct 
the earlier order. Id. 
The appellants sought relief pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a). The Court 
started its analysis by noting the between clerical errors and judicial errors, stating: 
The distinction between a judicial error and a clerical error does not 
depend upon who made it. Rather, it depends on whether it was made 
in rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered. 46 
Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 202. Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 
317, 471 P.2d 143, 145 (1970) (emphasis added). 
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The Court continued and stated that the ". . . correction contemplated by Rule 
60(a) must be undertaken for the purpose of reflecting the actual intention of the 
court and parties. 6A Moore's Federal Practice para. 60.60[1] (2d ed. 1983)." Id. 
The Court held that Rule 60(a) is not intended to correct errors of a substantial 
nature, particularly where the claim of error is unilateral. The fact that an intention 
was subsequently found to be mistaken would not cause the mistake to be 
"clerical" See Bershad v. McDonough, 469 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1972). 
The Court concluded: 
In the instant case, the error complained of may not be characterized as 
"clerical." The court may have erred in granting Parrish Oil Tools a 
dismissal with prejudice, but the appropriate remedy was a timely 
motion to amend and/or a timely appeal to this Court. 
Id. 
Defendants/Appellants submit that the setting aside of the Plaintiffs default 
was not clerical but was in response to the Plaintiffs motion. As such, a decision 
thereon had to be undertaken within the parameters of Rule 60(b) as discussed 
above. Because the trial court was not supplied sufficient evidence upon which to 
grant the Plaintiff relief, the setting aside of the default was an abuse of discretion 
regardless of the existence of findings and conclusions. 
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POINT IV: THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS INCLUDING FEES INCURRED ON 
APPEAL 
If this Court reverses the Trial Court's Minute Entry, the default of the 
Plaintiff will be reinstated and the litigation will be concluded with the exception of 
the issue of attorney fees. At the time set for trial in this case, the trial court, in 
addition to authorizing the default of the Plaintiff, also authorized the award of 
attorney fees (See R. 391-395, 375 (para. 13)). With the setting aside of the default, 
the issue of attorney fees was not decided. 
Defendants/Appellants request an order of this Court awarding attorney fees 
and costs on appeal and either an order awarding the fees requested in the trial court 
(R. 391-95) or an order remanding the case to the district court for the assessment 
of attorney fees and costs. 
The Plaintiff has throughout the proceeding, sought attorney fees based upon 
the language contained on the invoices (R. 2, para.8; 189, para. 10). The 
Defendants have likewise, throughout the proceeding, sought attorney fees based 
upon the "reciprocal attorney fee" provision contained in the Code (R. 64-65, 
Seventh Defense). 
Utah Code Annotated 78B-5-826 (2005 as Amended) provides as follows: 
Attorney fees — Reciprocal rights to recover attorney fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails 
in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or 
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other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one 
party to recover attorney fees. 
Id. 
Of course, the purpose of the section is to level the playing field by allowing 
either party to recover fees when only one party may assert such a right under a 
contract, remedying the unequal allocation of litigation risks built into many 
contracts. In addition, this statute rectifies the inequitable common-law result in 
which a party seeking to enforce a contract containing an attorney fees clause has a 
significant bargaining advantage over a party that seeks to invalidate the contract. 
Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 160 P.3d 1041 Utah 2007). 
Illustrating the concept is Myrah v. Campbell, 163 P.3d 679 (UT App 2007) 
In that case by a landlord against tenants for breach of the rental agreement, the 
agreement provided that only the landlord could recover attorney fees. However, 
because the Code established reciprocal rights to recover attorney fees based on a 
written contract and because the tenants defeated some of the landlord's claims, the 
case was remanded to the trial court to determine the appropriate award of attorney 
fees. Id. 
Given the equities of this case that include the Plaintiffs nonappearance at 
trial that subjected the Defendants to significant un-needed expense and the 
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Plaintiffs failure to comply with even the rudimentary basics of a Rule 60(b) 
application, subjecting the Defendants to significant post-decision and appeal 
expense, Defendants submit that an award of fees and costs both at the trial court 
and appeal level is appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the total absence of any facts that would demonstrate a basis 
under Rule 60(b), it is respectfully submitted that the trial court's Minute Entry of 
February 4, 2009 should be reversed and the case remanded for assessment of fees 
and costs at both the trial and appellate levels. 
DATED this Z(/day of May, 2009. 
Sarah Hardy, Esq. / 
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants 
29 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid to the 
following by first class mail, two copies of the foregoing brief on the J ^ aay of 
May, 2009. In addition a CD containing the PDF version of the foregoing was also 
included in the mailing. 
Dennis L. Mangrum, Esq. 
7110 South Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 






Notice of Rescheduled Bench Trial 
31 
mird Judicial District 
J U L 3 0 2008 
SALTUKHCOUNTV 
°«puty Clerk 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHEAP O ROOTER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOMINIUM H, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF f£&ae>H-&t>OU&b> 
BENCH TRIAL 
Case No: 050901063 DC 
Judge: JUDGE COLLECTION 
Date: July 29,2008 
BENCH TRIAL. 
Date: 10/28/2008 
Time: 09:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - N41 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDGE COLLECTION 
The reason for the change is Court Ordered 
THIS BENCH TRIAL WILL NOT BE CONTINUED WITHOUT THE WRITTEN 
STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES AND/OR WITHOUT THE JUDGE'S APPROVAL. 
UNAVAILABILITY OR NON-APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL OR PARTIES MAY RESULT 
IN DATES BEING SET WITHOUT COUNSEL'S INPUT, PLEADINGS MAY BE 
STRICKEN, COMPLAINT DISMISSED OR A DEFAULT ENTERED. 
Please call Carol @ 238-7388 with any scheduling conflicts. The 
responsibility of contacting the other party(ies) is that of the 
party requesting the change. 
Dated t h i s Tsh. day of 20 Cft?. 
Court's Notice of RESCHEDULED Bench Trial ( 
D i s t r i 
VD26842562 pages: 
050901063 MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOf 
Page 1 
Case No: 050901063 
Date: Jul 29, 2008 
The Court will provide interpreters for criminal cases and domestic 
violence cases involving protective orders or stalking injunctions. 
(Fees in criminal cases may be imposed at the judge's discretion.) 
IF YOU NEED AN INTERPRETER IN A CRIMINAL CASE OR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
CASE PLEASE NOTIFY THE COURT at 238-7338 (five days before.the 
hearing, if possible). 
FOR ALL OTHER CASES, you must bring someone with you to 
interpret. If you do not know someone who can help you, the names 
of court interpreters you can hire are listed on the courts' 
website athttp://www.utcourts.gov/resources/interp/certified.html. 
If you do not have access to the internet, ask the court clerk to 
print off a copy of this list for you. 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) should call Third District Court-Salt Lake at 
238-7500 at least three working days prior to the proceeding. (For 
TTY service call Utah Relay at 1-800-346-4128 or 711) 
Page 2 
Case No: 050901063 
Date: Jul 29, 2008 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 050901063 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail DENNIS L MANGRUM 
Attorney PLA 
7110 HIGHLAND DR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84121 
Mail SARAH H YOUNG 
Attorney DEF 
1781 SIDEWINDER DR STE 200 
PARK CITY UT 84060 
Dated this <%0 day of &uXtA , 2O_0& 5 
Page 3 (last) 
Addendum 
Exhibit "B" 
Minutes of Bench Trial 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHEAP 0 ROOTER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Case No: 050901063 DC 
Judge: ROBERT FAUST 






Tape Count: 9.3 0 
DENNIS L MANGRUM 
TRIAL 
COUNT: 9.30 
This case is before the court for trial. 
Defts did not appear. 
The court enters the default of Marmalade Square Condominium. 
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n :' nri on pu - . . -, 
Sarah H.Young (11301) 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
Attorneys for Defendant 
5532 Lillehammer, Ste. 104 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Telephone: (435)649-7369 
Facsimile: (435) 649-0246 
.•tp'.n 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHEAP-O-ROOTER, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOMINIUM 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR URCP 60(a) 
CORRECTION OF ENTRY OF 
DEFAULT 
Case No. 050901063 
Judge Collection 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Marmalade Square Condominium Homeowners 
Association, by and through counsel, Sarah H. Young of Young, Kester and Petro, and moves 
the Court for a Correction of the Minute Entry, entered on October 28th, 2008 by this Court 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a). In support thereof, the Defendant has filed a 
Memorandum in Support hereof, filed contemporaneously herewith. 
DATED this 30th day of October, 2008. 
Motion for URCP 60(a) Correction of Entry of Default @V 
VD27329100 pages: 2 
050901063 MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOf 
C^'^A^/yi_ r/* 
SARAH H. YOUNG 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
t^h I hereby certify that on the 30 day of October, 2008,1 mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Dennis L. Mangrum 
7110 South Highland Drive 
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Sarah H. Young (11301) 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETF 5ip »r , 
Attorneys for Defendant 
5532 Lillehammer, Ste. 104 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Telephone: (435) 649-7369 
Facsimile: (435)649-0246 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOMINIUM 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR URCP 60(a) 
CORRECTION OF ENTRY OF 
DEFAULT 
Case No. 050901063 
Judge Collection 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, Marmalade Square Condominium Homeowners 
Association, by and through counsel, Sarah H. Young of Young, Kester and Petro, submits his 
Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) Correction of 
Entry of Default, filed October 28th, 2008. In support hereof, the Defendant states and alleges as 
follows: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This matter was scheduled for trial on October 28, 2008. 
2. The parties were sent notice of the trial on July 29, 2008. 
VD27329106 pages: 
3. Notice was sent to Dennis Mangrum at his correct address, 7110 Highland Dr., 
Salt Lake City5 Utah 84121. 
4. The Notice stated "Non-Appearance of Counsel or parties may result in ... a 
default entered." 
5. On October 28, 2008, the Defendant and Defendant's counsel appeared at trial. 
6. Neither the Plaintiff nor the Plaintiffs counsel was present. 
7. The Court informed Defendant's counsel that it would enter default because the 
opposing party was not present, and informed Defendant's counsel they were free to leave. The 
Defendant's appearance was not made on the record, and the Court's representation was not 
stated on the record, because the Court was in the midst of another trial while this occurred. 
8. Later on October 28, 2008, Defendant's counsel received a minute entry stating 
that the Court had entered default against the Defendant. The minute entry wrongly stated that 
Plaintiffs counsel, Dennis Mangrum, had appeared that morning, and that the Defendant was not 
present. 
ARGUMENT 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) states that "[clerical mistakes in ... orders ... may be 
corrected by the court at any time ... on the motion of any party...." 
The Minute Entry entered by the Court on October 28, 2008, erroneously states that 
Dennis Mangrum was present at the October 28, 2008 trial, and that the Defendant failed to 
appear. In fact, Defendant's counsel, Sarah H. Young was present, along with co-counsel, Allen 
K. Young, Bruce Manka representative for Defendant Homeowners Association, and Defense 
Witness Amanda Paddock. Neither Dennis Mangrum nor any representative for the Plaintiff was 
present. The Court communicated with Mrs. Young through its bailiff that because the other 
party was not present, the Court would enter default, and that therefore they were free to leave. 
Defendant's counsel discovered later that default was incorrectly entered against the 
Defense, rather than against the Plaintiff who had failed to appear. The Defendant respectfully 
requests that the entry of default against the Defendant be corrected to reflect the Plaintiffs 
failure to appear at the trial scheduled on October 28, 2008. 
DATED this 30th day of October, 2008. 
s 
SARAH H. YO 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of October, 2008,1 mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Dennis L. Mangrum 
7110 South Highland Drive 




Sarah H.Young (11301) 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
Attorneys for Defendant 
5532 Lillehammer, Ste. 104 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Telephone: (435) 6 49-7369 
Facsimile: (435) 649-0246 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
450 S. State, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 




MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOMINIUM 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE COUNSEL 
SARAH H. YOUNG IN SUPPORT OF 
60(a) MOTION FOR CORRECTION OF 
ENTRY OF DEFAULT 
Case No. 050901063 
Judge Collection 
SARAH H. YOUNG, Attorney for Defendant, having been first duly sworn, under oath, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am the attorney for the Defendant in this matter. 
2. I am at least 18 years of age. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the 
State of Utah. My bar number is 11301. 
3. The trial in this matter was scheduled for trial on October 28, 2008. 
4. The parties were sent notice of the trial on July 29, 2008. 
5. No further notices have been sent out. !2S!? i l 
VD27356138 pages: 8 
n^AOAinfi.l MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOf 
6. The notice was sent to me, and I received it. It was also sent to Dennis Mangrum 
at his correct address, 7110 Highland Dr., Salt Lake City, Utah 84121. See Exhibit A. 
7. The Notice stated "Non-Appearance of Counsel or parties may result in ... a 
default entered/' 
8. On October 28, 2008, I appeared for trial at the correct courtroom, N41, at 9:15 
am, 15 minutes early. 
9. I arrived with co-counsel, Allen K. Young, and with a representative for the 
Defendant Corporation, Bruce Manka. Also present was the Defense witness, Amanda Paddock. 
10. My appearance was not stated on the record, because the Court was busy 
conducting another trial at the time. The Court's bailiff approached me and, after I presented 
him with our notice of trial, attached as Exhibit A, the bailiff confirmed that our trial was 
scheduled on October 28, 2008 at 9:30 am in Courtroom N41. He asked me to attempt to meet 
with Plaintiffs counsel prior to trial to resolve as many issues as possible, and stated that the 
Court would try to hear our trial. 
11. I waited for Plaintiffs counsel to appear, and neither Plaintiffs counsel nor the 
Plaintiff appeared for trial. 
12. After the Court and the Defense waited for approximately 10-15 minutes, the 
Court informed Defense counsel through the bailiff that the Defense could leave, and that the 
Court would enter default based on the Plaintiffs failure to appear. 
13. After inquiry from me through the bailiff, the Court asked me to file a request for 
attorney's fees to accompany my default paperwork. 
2 
14. None of the Court's nor my representations or appearances were made on the 
record, due to the trial that was being conducted at the time. 
15. When I returned to my office, I received a minute entry that erroneously entered a 
default against my client, stating that neither me nor my client had appeared, and that Dennis 
Mangrum had been present at our trial that morning. 
16. I state these facts and the foregoing voluntarily and of my own personal 
knowledge. 
SARAH H. YOl 
Attorney for Defdntiant 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) :ss 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 
SARAH H. YOUNG, Attorney for Defendant, is personally known to me or presented 
satisfactory proof of identity to me. After being sworn and while under oath he/she stated that 
he/she was acting voluntarily, had read and understood the preceding document, and that the 
contents were true. He/She then signed the document in my presence. 
DATED this 31st day of October, 2008. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 








CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this October 31, 2008, I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Dennis L. Mangrum 
7110 South Highland Drive 




3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHEAP O ROOTER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOMINIUM H, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF \Z£&CAr^WU£^ 
BENCH TRIAL 
Case No: 050901063 DC 
Judge: JUDGE COLLECTION 
Date: July 29,2008 
BENCH TRIAL. 
Date: 10/28/2008 
Time: 09:30 a.m. 
Location: Fourth Floor - N41 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
4 50 SOUTH STATE 
SLC, UT 84114-1860 
Before Judge: JUDGE COLLECTION 
The reason for the change is Court Ordered 
THIS BENCH TRIAL WILL NOT BE CONTINUED WITHOUT THE WRITTEN 
STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES AND/OR WITHOUT THE JUDGE'S APPROVAL. 
UNAVAILABILITY OR NON-APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL OR PARTIES MAY RESULT 
IN DATES BEING SET WITHOUT COUNSELS INPUT, PLEADINGS MAY BE 
STRICKEN, COMPLAINT DISMISSED OR A DEFAULT ENTERED. 
Please call Carol @ 238-7388 with any scheduling conflicts. The 
responsibility of contacting the other party(ies) is that of the 
party requesting the change. 
Dated this ffi*day of /OLAX^J 20 £>f) 
*r 
District Court Dep' 
Page 1 070 
Case No: 050901063 
Date: Jul 29, 2008 
The Court will provide interpreters for criminal cases and domestic 
violence cases involving protective orders or stalking injunctions. 
(Fees in criminal cases may be imposed at the judge's discretion.) 
IF YOU NEED AN INTERPRETER IN A CRIMINAL CASE OR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
CASE PLEASE NOTIFY THE COURT at 23 8-733 8 (five days before the 
hearing, if possible). 
FOR ALL OTHER CASES, you must bring someone with you to 
interpret. If you do not know someone who can help you, the names 
of court interpreters you can hire are listed on the courts1 
website athttp://www.utcourts.gov/resources/interp/certified.html. 
If you do not have access to the internet, ask the court clerk to 
print off a copy of this list for you. 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) should call Third District Court-Salt Lake at 
23 8-7500 at least three working days prior to the proceeding. (For 
TTY service call Utah Relay at 1-800-346-4128 or 711) 
Page 2 
Case No: 050901063 
Date: Jul 29, 2008 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 050901063 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail DENNIS L MANGRUM • 
Attorney PLA 
7110 HIGHLAND DR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84121 
Mail SARAH H YOUNG 
Attorney DEF 
1781 SIDEWINDER DR STE 2 00 
PARK CITY UT 84060 
Dated this Of ^)u/lU / 2v£Fb . 
Page 3 (last) 
Addendum 
Exhibit "D" 
Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Default 
34 
NDV-03-200B WON 04:22 PM "NNIS MANGRUM FAX No. 8 0 ' H 4 4 P. 002 
DENNIS L. MANGRUM #3687 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
7110 South Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
(801)943-8107 
(801) 9434744 (Fax) By. 
W L » DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV - 3 2008 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
0«pUtyCI«* 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
430 South State St, Salt Lake City, Ut 84111; 801.238-7800 






ASSOCIATION, a UtahCorporatkm 
Defendant 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT 
AND SET NEW TRIAL DATE 
OV1LNO.-.050901063 
Judge: DEBT COLLECTION 
NOW COMES Plaintiff files this Motion to set aside the default of the Plaintiff 
and schedule a new trial date. 
The plaintiff believed that the trial date was November 14,2008, and has prepared 
for that date. It appears that the trial date was originally set for November 14,2008, and 
then changed to October 14,2008, and then changed again to October 28,2008. The 
Plaintiff believed the trial was set for November 14,2008. The Plaintiff did not receive a 
phone call or any kind of notice on October 28,2008, that the trial was proceeding and 
the Defendants attorney knew the Plaintiff was ready for trial as exhibits and witness lists 
had been mailed only weeks earlier. 
The Plaintiff believes that the changes in setting of the trial dates caused the 
Motion to Set Aside Default and Set New Trial Date (faxec 
V027349833 pages: 2 
050901063 MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOI 
-03-2008 MON 04:22 PM KIS WANGRUM FAX No. 80!? U4 
confusion and is the reason the Plaintiff did not appear on October 2 8 , 2 0 0 8 . The 
Plaintiff has i t ' s case prepared and witness ready for trial on November 2 8 , 2 0 0 8 . 
Dennis L. Man] 
Attorney for Plaini 
CERTIFICATE O F MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the j i . day of hic\\. . 2008,1 served the foregoing Motion 
to set aside the default, by: 0 depositing copies thereof in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed as follows, or by (x)FAXING copies to the numbers listed below: 
Sarah H. Young 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
5532 Lillchammer Lane No. 104 




Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition 
to Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Default 
35 
Sarah H.Young (ll 301) 
Y O U N G , K E S T E R & P E T R O ' ' - - ,•' 
Attorneys for Defendant 
5532 Lillehammer, Ste. 104 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Telephone: (435) 649-7369 
Facsimile: (435) 649-0246 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
450 S. State, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 




MARMALADE SQUARE ] 
CONDOMINIUM HOMEOWNERS ] 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation, ] 
BRUCE MANKA and FRANK GUYMAN ] 
Defendants. ] 
i DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN 
> OPPOSITION TO THE PLAINTIFF'S 
I RULE 60(b) MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
) DEFAULT 
> Case No. 050901063 DC 
1 Judge: CJ 
The Defendants, Marmalade Square Condominium Homeowners Association and Bruce 
Manka, by and through their counsel submit the following memorandum in opposition to the 
Plaintiff s motion to set aside the default entered by the Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On July 22,2008, this matter was originally set for trial on November 14, 2008. 
2. The Court docket will reflect that on July 25, 2008, the Court sent a correcting 
Deft's memorandum in opposition io the pltf s rule 60(1 
VD27466285 pages: 6 
notice to the parties changing the trial date from November 14, 2008 at 9:30 a.m. to the same 
time on October 14, 2008. 
3. On July 29 and 30, 2008, as a result of a conference call with the Court and the 
two counsel, the trial date was changed to October 28, 2008, at 9:20 a.m., a date and time cleared 
with the offices of both counsel. 
4. Counsel for the Plaintiff prepared a pretrial order and submitted notice of the 
witnesses and exhibits that he intended to use at the time of trial. Likewise, counsel for the 
Defendants submitted the required filings. 
5. On the day of trial, the Defendants and their counsel were present and prepared 
for trial. The Plaintiff did not appear in person or by counsel. 
6. The court has erroneously entered the default of the Defendants as opposed to 
entering of the default of the Plaintiff, who failed to appear. Counsel for the Defendants has 
submitted a Rule 60(a) motion to correct the clerical error. 
7. Neither Plaintiff nor its counsel, in its motion for Rule 60(b) relief, has provided 
the Court with any basis cognizable under Rule 60(b), to justify relieving the Plaintiff from the 
consequences of its failure to appear at trial. 
8. This case was filed on January 19, 2005 and therefore has been pending for over 
three- and-one-half years. The case has already produced one notice from the Court of its intent 




ONLY THE DEMONSTRATION OF A TIMELY APPLICATION, PROPER 
GROUNDS AND A DEFENSE ON THE MERITS JUSTIFIES 
THE SETTING ASIDE OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in relevant part as follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect. . . . The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for 
reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken. . . The procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent 
action. 
As established by the Utah Supreme Court in Erichon v. Schenkers, 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 
1994), the Court held that in order to prevail on a motion to set aside a default judgment, the 
moving party must establish 1) that the motion seeking relief was timely filed (within three 
months); 2) that a basis for the relief has been established under the Rule (mistake, inadvertence 
or excusable neglect); and 3) that the party against whom the default has been entered has a 
meritorious defense on the merits. Id. See also, Hernandez v. Baker, 104 P.3d 664 (Utah App. 
2004); Black's Title, Inc., 991 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1999); and Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 
2000). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that "[t]o demonstrate that the default was due to 
excusable neglect, f[t]he movant must show that he has used due diligence and that he was 
prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control.n, Black's Title, Inc., 
i 
991 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1999) (quoting Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 
513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court has 
defined "excusable neglect" as "the exercise of 'due diligence' by a reasonably prudent person 
under similar circumstances." Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 
1987) (citing Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973)). 
In Erickson, the Court determined that a defense is sufficiently meritorious to have a 
default judgment set aside if it is entitled to be tried. Id. 
POINT II: 
THE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS TO ALLOW 
THIS COURT TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT, 
In applying the law to the facts of this case, it is respectfully submitted that the Plaintiff 
has failed to comply with the critical requirements of the Rule. The only element that the Plaintiff 
has met is the time requirement. Plaintiff filed its motion for relief within three months of the 
entry of the default judgment in this case, which occurred on October 28, 2008. 
The Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a factual basis that falls within the Utah Supreme 
Court's definition of "mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect." The trial date that was set in 
this matter was established by counsel for the parties and the Court on a conference call. Notice 
of the trial date was sent to the attorneys by the court. The parties acted in conformity with the 
Court's instruction in filing a pretrial order and filing notices relating to witnesses and exhibits 
that were to be used at trial. No effort was taken by the Plaintiff prior to the morning of trial to 
obtain a continuance or otherwise modify the trial date and time. The Plaintiff does not contend 
that the trial date was set without consulting its counsel and does not contend that it did not 
receive notice of the trial. Further, if counsel for the Plaintiff acted in accordance with his 
4 
responsibility, notice of the trial was both in the hands of counsel and the hands of the 
representatives of the Plaintiff, who would have received a copy of the notice from counsel. 
In Allred v. Allred, 2005 UT App 338 (2005), the district court entered judgment against 
the defendant after he failed to appear at the scheduled trial and denied his motion for a new trial 
and for relief from judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 59 and 60. Id. The Utah Appellate Court found 
that the district court mailed defendant a "notice of trial" which was signed by the district court 
judge. The notice timely and adequately described the nature of the proceedings against him. The 
Court of Appeals found that the district court's finding that defendant did not act with ordinary 
prudence or as a result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect was well supported. 
Id. 
In Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 Utah 2d 293, 373 P.2d 573 (1962), "the [defendant's] attorney 
thought he had filed an answer but . . . he had mistakenly not done so." Id, at 573. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a default judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff when the evidence was that "the attorney then representing the plaintiff 
called the defendant's attorney's attention to the fact that the matter was in default and that a 
default judgment would be taken unless something was done." Id.; see also Pacer Sport & Cycle, 
Inc. v. Myers, 534 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1975) (finding no excusable neglect under rule 60 where 
defendant "assumed the action had been taken care of and therefore took no steps to file an 
answer to the complaint"). 
As noted above, the Utah Supreme Court has defined "excusable neglect" as "the exercise 
of'due diligence' by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." Mini Spas, Inc. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987) (citing Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 
30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973)). No one could argue that failing to appear, for no 
5 
reason, at trial in a case pending for over three years, when adequate notice was sent and received, 
that had been set by stipulation, portrays due diligence. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the total absence of any facts that would demonstrate a basis under Rule 
60(b), the Plaintiffs motion to set aside the default should be denied. 
DATED this /^/day of November, 2008. 
TS.fjhl/hai 
Sarah H. Young, Esq.7/ 
Attorney for Defendam Marmalade 
CERTIFICATE OF FAXING AND MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing was faxed and mailed, postage prepaid to the 
following by first class mail, on the jifoky of November, 2008. 
Dennis L. Mangrum, Esq. 
7110 South Highland Drive 





Order Correcting Entry of Default 
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Default 
050901063 MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOt 
Sarah H.Young (11301) 
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO 
Attorneys for Defendant 
5532 Lillehamrner, Ste. 104 
Park City, Utah 84098 
Telephone: (435) 649-7369 
Facsimile: (435) 649-0246 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
DEC 2 2 2008 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
DMUtyClwK 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 




MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOMINIUM 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER CORRECTING ENTRY OF 
DEFAULT 
^Af^^JeA b<^ 
Z-fo/ol /Wi'wh^- < ^ « ^ 
Case No. 050901063 
Judge Collection 
This matter came on regularly before the Court on Defendant's Motion for 60(a) 
Correction of the Entry of Default entered against the Defendant on October 28, 2008. The Court 
finds that the Defendant and Defendant's counsel appeared for trial on October 28, 2008, and 
that both .the Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel failed to appear. The Court, therefore, for good 
cause appearing, having reviewed the pleadings on the file, and being fully advised in the 
premises, and hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and DECREES as follows: 
ORDER 
1. The Court hereby relieves the Defendant from the default entered on October 28, 
2008 against the Defendant. 
2. The Court hereby enters the default of the Plaintiff, who failed to appear for trial 
on October 28,2008. 
DATED this l^k day of ffc>CCz^vt&~
 2 0 0 8 
RULE 7 NOTICE 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant has submitted the 
above and foregoing Order to the Court for signature. Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, any objection to the form of the Order should be filed with the Court within 
five days after service upon you of this notice. 
DATED this 30th day of October, 2008 
SARAH H. YOlMG 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 30 day of October, 2008,1 mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Dennis L. Mangrum 
7110 South Highland Drive 




Minute Entry Setting Aside Plaintiffs 
Default 
37 
i .JED DISTRICT COuHT 
Third Judicial District 
FEB - 4 2009 
SALT LAKt COUNTY 
py ^ 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CHEAP 0 ROOTER, : 
Plaintiff, : MINUTE ENTRY 
vs. : Case No: 050901063 
MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOMINIUM H, : Judge: JUDGE COLLECTION 
Defendant. : Date: February 4, 2009 
This case came before the court for consideration of Defendant's 
Motion for Correction of Entry of Default and Plaintiff's Motion to 
Set Aside Default and Set New Trial Date. After review of the 
file and pleadings therein, the court rules that the default of 
any party previously entered is hereby Set Aside. The clerk is 
directed to set this case for a PreTrial Conference, so that 
settlement discussions may be effected and/or a mutually-acceptable 
date for a new Bench Trial may be set. This minute entry is the 
order of the court on this issue; no further order is required. 
Case No: 050901063 
Date: Feb 04, 2009 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 050901063 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail DENNIS L MANGRUM 
Attorney PLA 
7110 HIGHLAND DR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84121 
Mail SARAH H YOUNG 
Attorney DEF 
5532 LILLEHAMMER LN STE 104 
PARK CITY UT 84098 
Page 2 (last) 
